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ENVIRONMENTAL ARTICLE 
THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF PUBLIC 
INFORMATION MANDATES UNDER FEDERAL 
HAZARDOUS WASTE LAW: A POLICY ANALYSIS 
Robert F. Blomquist* 
INTRODUCTION 
Public information laws generally mandate the private or pub-
lic sectors to provide specific facts, data, documents, and reports to 
various groups of people. These laws have been in existence for a 
relatively short time. The origin of public information laws can be 
traced back to legislation enacted during tl1e New Deal under 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. 1 Public information laws have 
proliferated since the introduction of federal securities laws and 
state Blue Sky provisions which required disclosure of material fi-
nancial data by. firms seeking to raise capital from the public sale 
of stock. 2 Examples of such laws, promulgated by both legislative 
and judicial design, include product labeling requirements, product 
warranty laws, land use planning provisions, freedom of informa-
tion dictates, campaign reporting provisions, and bankruptcy dis-
closure requirements. Indeed, public information laws have become 
more commonplace because of the nearly universal assumption 
that dissemination of information is socially desirable and thus 
leads to more efficient markets and more responsible behavior by 
business, government, and individuals. 
While public information laws can lead to socially desirable 
results, insufficient attention has been devoted to analyzing how 
these mandates may also create negative second-order conse-
quences.3 The thesis of this article is that public environmental in-
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. J.D., Cornell Law School 
(1977); B.S., University of Pennsylvania (Wharton School, 1973). 
1. See generally J.M. BURNS, THE CROSSWINDS OF FREEDOM 25-26 (1989). 
2. See The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988). See generally M. PAR-
RINO, TRUTH IN SECURITIES: AN INTRODUCTORY GuiDE TO THE SECURITIES AcT OF 1933 23-25 
(1968). The most noteworthy public information law is The Freedom of Information Act, 5 
u.s.c. § 552 (1988). 
3. See Blomquist, Solar Energy Development, State Constitutional Interpretation and 
Mount Laurel II: Second-Order Consequences of Innovative Policymaking by the New 
• 
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formation alone does not necessarily result in public knowledge or 
societal wisdom. Indeed, too much raw, undigested information can 
lead to confusion, dissonance, and counterproductive social policy. 
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 
(SARA)4 ~ontains several public environmental information man-
dates with potential revolutionary legal and policy consequences. 
This article is divided into three major parts and explores the na-
ture and implications of these public information requirements. 
First, the article provides general background on public. environ-
. . 
mental information and disclosure laws. As part of this analysis, 
the article sketches potential public policy roles and pathologies of 
these generic types of laws. Second, the article describes three sig-
nificant hazardous substance information programs under SARA: 
(1) the chemical inventory and emissions provisions of Title III; (2) 
the responsibilities of federal health officials both to develop toxi-
cological profiles of the most troublesome toxic substances released 
into the environment and to provide health assessments of existing 
Superfund sites; and (3) the availability of federal funds for citizen 
groups to obtain technical assistance for amassing, collecting, and 
analyzing information on abandoned hazardous waste facilities. Fi-
nally, the article concludes with an analysis of the policy limits of 
' 
hazardous substan~ce information roles of SARA. 
l. POLICY ROLES AND PATHOLOGIES OF PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL 
INFORMATION LAWS 
Public environmental information laws have been a fixed fea-
ture of the American legal landscape since the passage of the Air 
Pollution Prevention and Control Act amendments of 1970 (Clean 
Air Act)6 and the Federal Water Pollution and Control Act amend-
ments of 1972 (Clean Water Act).6 For example, under section 114 
of the Clean Air Act, the Administrator of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) is authorized to require "any person who 
Jersey Supreme Court, 15 RuTGERS L.J. 573, 576-77 (1984). See generally R . BAUER, SEc-
OND-ORDER CONSEQUENCES: A METHODOLOGICAL ESSAY ON THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY 
(1969); D. HoROWITZ, THE CouRTS AND SociAL PoLICY 292 (1977). 
4. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (Supp. V 1987))~ SARA amended the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980. 
5. Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)). 
6. Pub. L. No. 92·500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). 
• 
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owns or operates any emission source or who is subject to any re-
quirement" of the Act to generate information necessary to fulfill 
the EPA's mission in regulating air pollutants.7 The Administrator 
is authorized by Congress to require operators to perform the fol-
lowing functions: ''(A) establish and maintain such records, (B) 
make such reports, (C) install, use, and maintain such monitoring 
equipment or methods, (D) sample such emissions ... and (E) pro-
vide such other information as may be reasonably require[d]."8 
These records are available to the general public, subject to non-
disclosure if the records constitute trade secrets.9 
In language closely tracking the Clean Air Act, section 308 of 
the Clean Water Act authorizes the EPA Administrator to ''require 
the owner or operator of any point source to (i) establish and 
maintain such records, (ii) make such reports, (iii) install, use, and 
-maintain such monitoring equipment or methods ... (iv) sample 
such effluents ... and (v) provide such other information [as may 
be] reasonably require[d]" to carry out the purposes of the Act.10 
The Clean Water Act also affords the public .access to pollution 
d~ta subject to the trade secret exception.11 
Public environmental information laws have grown in popular 
and legal prominence since the early 1980's when citizen suits 
under federal pollution control laws increased dramatically. 12 Con-
current with the increased availability of public information, the 
perceived usefulness of environmental information laws has also 
gained recognition. Yet, little thought and comprehensive analysis 
_have been dedicated to the possible policy roles and pathologies of 
these laws.13 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a) (1982). 
8. /d. § 7414(a)(l)(A)-(E). 
9. Id. § 7414(c). 
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(4)(A) (1982). 
11. /d. § 1318(b). 
12. See generally Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of Environ-
mental Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-
Independent Values, 22 GA. L. REv. 337 (1988); Boyer & Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory 
Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental 
Laws, 34 BuFFALO L. REV. 833, 835 (1985) (assessing the potential effects of the rise of pri-
vate regulatory enforcement proceedings and speculating on how this realignment might 
affect the regulatory process); Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace, 
9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 23 (1985). 
13. See infra notes 14-50 and accompanying text. 
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A. Possible Policy Roles 
Four discernible policy roles exist for affording the public ac-
cess to environmental information produced by private industry 
and governmental analysis: (1) helping private individuals and 
communities minimize health risks; (2) promoting economic ac-
countability by particular businesses for the residuals they created; 
(3) pressuring business to reduce or eliminate harmful environ-
mental contaminants; and (4) enhancing certain process values 
that are inherent in American democracy . 
• 
1. The Individual Risk Minimization Role 
In theory, access to information about environmental contami-
nants enables individuals and community groups to take appropri-
ate action to minimize adverse health risks. Appropriate action in 
response to this information might include: (a) avoiding areas 
where harmful pollutants are located; (b) minimizing exposure to 
contaminated media, for example, by drinking bottled water in 
areas where water discharges exceed permitted levels, or by staying 
indoors in nonattainment air quality regions; or (c) using the polit-
ical and legal systems to pressure business to stop or reduce 
pollution. 
2. The Economic Accountability Role 
Public environmental information laws may also be useful to 
recapture a company's economic benefit gained by its failure to 
control the release of residuals14 into the environment. A business 
can choose to invest its retained earnings in technological improve-
ments that will reduce residuals or use them for other purposes. 
These other purposes may include higher wages for workers, 
greater dividends for shareholders, and increased bonuses for man-
agers. Therefore, if a private enterprise chooses any of these latter 
alternatives, public information concerning the quantity and qual-
14. A residual is: 
[a] nonproduct (material or energy) output, the value of which is less than 
the costs of collecting, processing, and transporting it for use. Thus, the defi-
nition is time dependent, that is, it is a function of (1) the level of technology 
in the society at the point in time and (2) the relative costs of alternative 
inputs at that point in time. For example, manure in the United States is 
now a residual, whereas thirty or so years ago it was a valuable raw material. 
A. KNEESE & B. BowER. ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY AND RESIDUALS MANAGEMENT, 6 n.1 (1979). 
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' 
ity of pollutants can assist in holding that enterprise accountable 
for reduction in property values in the surrounding community, in-
creased medical expenses from acute and chronic diseases, and 
diminution in the quality of life in the proximity of a plant. 
3. The Action-Forcing Role 
A legal mandate requiring public availability of environmental 
information, produced by either private industry or governmental 
agencies, may indu~e businesses to improve their operations and 
reduce harmful environmental contaminants. By way of scientific 
analogy, this action-forcing policy role is akin to potential energy;16 
by contrast, the individual risk minimization and economic ac-
countability roles are in the nature of kinetic energy.16 Businesses 
subject to public environmental information laws may be en-
couraged as a result of press coverage of corporate irresponsibility 
to modernize their operations and to take environmental responsi-
bilities more seriously than they might otherwise be inclined to do. 
4. The Process-Enhancing Role 
In addition to serving substantive policy roles, public environ-
mental information laws can also function to enhance important 
process values17 of American democracy. First, participatory gov-
ernance can be fostered because citizens are given the opportunity 
to become involved in monitoring dischargers and acting as watch· 
dogs over government environmental enforcement activity. Second, 
the value of process legitimacy can be enhanced because a climate 
• 
of openness tends to bolster public confidence in the administra-
tive monitoring_ and enforcement scheme. 
Third, public environmental information laws have the capac-
ity to advance humaneness and respect for individual dignity be-
cause individuals are given "fair access to legal processes on an 
15. Potential energy may be defined as the energy derived from position rather than 
motion. WEBSTER's II NEw RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 920 (1984). 
16. Kinetic energy may be defined as energy associated with motion. /d. at 605. In this 
context, kinetic energy refers to social outcomes produced by individual litigation, govern-
mental regulation, or political action. 
17. See generally Blomquist, supra note 12, at 344-51. According to Professor Robert 
Summers, "[l]egal systems operate through various legal processes, including processes for 
designating officials, for creating law, for applying it, for enforcing remedies, and for impos-
ing sanctions., Summers, Evaluating and I mprouing Legal Processes - A Plea for Process 
Values, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 1 (1974). 
• 
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eQuaJ ,-basis·.~ with. pther. citize{!s-:?!!~, Fourth,.~:and ·.closely:. related to. 
the· two: previous .(process· values,.~ these .la-ws·~~ are ~;capable ~of. promot~: 
ing :consensua.lism·, because~·itheir~·underlying.= purpose· defers '.'to· .in~:. 
dividual ~ch.oice .. and ~motiyation~ in~-:.partic~pating, -~.:or ~declining, .to~ 
participate, in various democratic activities."19 Such activities in-
clude: monitoring environ~enta1 ·progress~· ·complaining to company 
officials, petitioning government officials, litigating against recalci-
trant or ro·gue~-compit'iiie·s,. ;an·d::·organizing :pu·blic ·~boycotts~ :of. prod-
ucts produced with·.'.high.:·environmental :irnpi.cts·.t . .-.r~. ··.··: ~ ~ :~·., [:t '>:: ... ·,:·1~.~; 
• • 
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agency rule-makin·gj;::and···.·ch·ah-ces :.:to·. file am-icus,· briefs with the 
courts afford indirect access. to public and private decisionmakers. 
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B. Potential Policy Pathologies . ~ ; • • ""1: .. 
In general, environmental public information laws may give 
rise to eight policy "pathologies":23 (1) lack of coordination, (2) 
conflict over goals, (3) hyperactivity, (4) faulty informational re-
18. Blomquist, supra note 12, at 348 (footnote omitted) . 
19. ld. at 348·49. 
20. I d. at 350. 
21. ld. 
22. ld. at 351. See also Huff. Protecting Due Process and Civic Friendship in the Ad-
ministrative State, 42 MONT. L. REv. 1 (1981). 
23. See generally, B. Hoowoon & B. PETERS, THE PA1'HOLOGY OF PuBLIC POLICY (1985). 
Hogwood and Peters base their book on an analytical taxonomy of certain pathologies of 
policymaking. The use of this medical metaphor provides a framework for the categorization 
of the "diseases" of certain public policies and contributes to an understanding of policy 
dysfunctions. In an analogous way, the concept of policy pathologies is similar to the more 
general policy concept of second-order consequences. See supra note 3. 
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ceptors, (5) failures in communicating information to deci-
sionmakers, (6) government learning disabilities, (7) pathologies 
arising from attempts to improve existing information, and (8) in-
formational placebo effects. 
1. Lack of Coordination 
The first pathology consists of a lack of coordination among 
state and federal governmental enforcement officials and citizen 
groups. Certain environmental protection policies of state and fed-
eral governmental enforcement officials arguably suffer negative 
consequences24 because of the "countervailing impacts''26 of citi-
zen-initiated actions. These actions have proliferated under the 
Clean Water Act in the 1980's, encouraged by widespread public 
access to discharge monitoring reports and notices of violations 
filed by permit holders under the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES).26 Similar coordination problems 
can also result from other environmental public information laws. 
2. Conflict Over Goals 
Environmental information laws may produce "fundamental 
goal conflicts"27 among government agencies, p-rivate industry, and 
members of the public. For example, one goal conflict exists be-
tween citizen groups, environmental agencies, and private industry. 
When prosecuting cases for civil penalties under the Clean Water 
Act, these citizen groups possess differing interests and agendas 
than do agencies &nd private industry. Disclosure of environmental 
information regarding industry efforts to meet discharge stan.dards 
may lead to responses of citizen groups that risk undermining le-
• 
24. Blomquist, supra note 12, at 407-21. These negative consequences were engendered 
by specific legal rules which, among other things: 
· allow private parties with no prior involvement in administr~t.tive enforce-
ment negotiations, who have suffered no palpable personal or property in-
• jury, to seek substantial monetary fines ... ; 
~ provide an unrealistically short period of time for government officials to 
ponder the merits of ·a penalty enforcement action ... ; 
- tend to discourage further negotiation and concilia_tion betwe.en government 
and industry, while perversely dissuading government officials from providing 
input into crucial issues . . . . 
/d. at 412 (citations omitted). 
25. B. HOGWOOD & B. PETERS, supra note 23, at 44. 
26. See supra note 12. 
27. Jd. at 46. 
• 
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gitimate government regulatory goals. 28 While Congress intended 
citizen groups to fill the void of recalcitrant government enforce-
ment agencies,29 it is unlikely that Congress anticipated or en-
dorsed goal conflicts that would be counterproductive to fair and 
effective environmental regulation between private citizen groups 
and public agencies. 30 
3. Hyperactivity 
In the realm of environmental information laws, hyperactivity 
by government regulators in response to pressure by an inflamed 
public can prove dysfunctional and pathological. As explained by 
Professors Hogwood and Peters in more generic terms: 
[The pathological public policy characteristic of hyperactiv-
ity] is manifested in the need of some agencies to promulgate 
rules and regulations ... but may go beyond that. As well as 
merely making more rules, organizations may attempt to do 
something even if something is not required, or even if the 
action may be counterproductive. Organizations concerned 
with a particular policy area may believe they have more than 
a watching brief over the area, and that they are required to 
respond to any problems which arise.31 
4. Faulty Informational Receptors 
Public environmental information laws necessitate that gov-
ernment utilize informational receptors. 32 Government "failure to 
design [suitable] information collection procedures in advance may 
• 
lead to inadequate information being available when problems be-
28. Cf. Blomquist, supra note 12, at 407-21 (negative impacts of citizen as ·prosecutor 
model under the Clean Water Act regarding federal and state government enforcement and 
facilitation of trust and support between government regulators and industry). 
29. Pursuant to 33 U .S.C. § 1365 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) citizens may sue water pol-
luters for injunctive relief and civil penalties upon meeting a sixty-day notice provision of 
their intention to file suit. However, no citizen suit is actionable under the Clean Water Act: 
[l]f the Administrator or State has commenced .and is diligently prosecuting 
a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State, to require 
compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in 
a court of the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right. 
ld. § 1365(b)(l)(B) (1982) . 
30. See generally Blomquist, supra note 12, at 403-07. 
31. B. Hocwooo & B. PETERS, supra note 23, at 55. 
32. See generally id. at 63. 
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come ~urrent. "33 Indeed, with faulty environmental information re-
ceptors in place, "in times of crises ~ ." . . [private and public] organi-
zation[s] may suffer from information overload . " 34 In .a related 
way, "there is a danger that as a result of inertia (or lack of any 
thinking about policy relevance when the administrative data col-
lection system was designed) inappropriate or inadequate sources 
of data may be generating misleading signals. "35 
Because of the complexity of managing environmental infor-
mation, it is arguable that "policy analysts should not actively en-
gage in seeking out new information and new problems for govern-
ment, since this would entail increasing the demands on the 
political system without necessarily increasing the resources to 
meet those demands . . . or the capacity of the political system to 
resolve issues."36 Moreover, "[e]qually daunting is the task of fil-
tering out erroneous information"3·7 by government policy~akers, 
private citizens, and business executives. 
33. I d. at 64. 
34. Id. at 63. This can be particularly troublesome in some policy contexts. For exam-
ple, '' [ d]esigning procedures for regulating the amount, kind, and sources of information 
transmitted within and between organizations engaged in emergency management is central 
to timely, informed choice by organizational decisionmakers~" Comfort, Designing Policy 
For Action: The Emergency Management System, in MANAGING DISASTERS: STRATEGIES AND 
POLICY PERSPECTIVES 18 (L. Comfort ed. 1988) (hereinafter MANAGING DISASTERS]. Indeed, 
• 
different types of policy problems require different types of organizational information 
receptors: 
[T]he decisionmaking process for emergency organizations is distinctly differ· 
ent under emerge11cy conditions than in routine operations. In an emergency, 
problems are ill-structured. Environmental conditions are changing and dy-
namic. Numbers of clientele involved expand and contract dramatically. 
Time is critical, and complexity increases geometrically with the degree of 
interaction among participants and conditions. Systematic methods of deci-
sionmaking., based upon orderly search of all possible alternatives for action, 
prove less effective in complex environments than "rules of thumb" or heu-
ristic decision processes .... The· function of design in emergency decision-
making processes is to structure the elements of decision-information, timing, 
. 
known constraints, interaction among participants in a process that is likely 
to yield the most appropriate choice in the most ti~ely fashion. 
!d .. at 16 (footnotes omitted). See also Comfort & Cahill, Increasing Problem·Solving Ca-
pacity Between Organizations: The Role of Information in Managing the May 31, 1985 
Tornado Disaster in Western Pennsylvania, in MANAGING DISASTERS, supra, at 180 
(stressing the importance of open How of information, interpersonal communication and 
trust, articulation of professional goals and norms, and systematic feedback mechanisms). 
35. B. HoGwooo & B. PETERS, supra note 23, at 66. 
36. /d. at 67. 
37. /d. at 68. 
• 
• 
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5. Failures in Communicating Information to Decisionmakers 
Public environmental information laws mandate that great 
quantities of information be made available to the public. The 
quality of this information becomes problematic when juxtaposed 
with independent, and sometimes confidential, government, citi-
• 
zen, and industry information sources. Due to the substantial 
quantity and variable quality of information, these laws may pose 
a risk of pathological policy outcomes if appropriate information is 
not communicated to private or public decisionmakers. Unfortu-
nately, it is an administrative reality that 
• 
[m]uch of the information which is collected [within a single 
organization] never reaches. the parts of an organization 
which would find it most useful. Such failures of communica-
tion can be vertical (i.e. failure of front-line subordinates to 
report relevant information to ·superiors) or horizontal, as 
wh·en a line unit fails to pass on information about opportuni-
ties to, say, a research or policy analysis section.38 
This pathological policy results in public and private deci-
sionmakers receiving information in a garbled form with the jam-
ming of the overall information network. This may occur with va-
rying degrees and "drastic consequences for the functioning of the 
network as a whole may occur."39 
6. Government Learning Disabilities 
"One of the major pathologies of modern public policy is the 
failure of government to realize that programs it is delivering are 
failing to achieve their objectives or are even acting in a way con-
trary to those objectives."40 This problem arises because systematic 
evaluation is complicated by several variables: (a) "the objectives 
of [a] program may not have been clearly specified";41 (b) the pro-
gram itself may be poorly understood or ambiguously defined; (c) 
"major difficulties may arise in measuring what has or has not 
happened";42 and (d) "the given program is likely to be impacting 
on its target clientele in conjunction with a wide range of other 
• 
38. I d. at 68 .. 69. • 
39. ld. at 71. 
40. I d. at 80. 
41. ld. at 81. 
42. I d. at 82. 
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influences, including other public policy programs, whose overall 
effect may be extremely difficult to disentangle."43 
The difficulty of systematically evaluating the efficacy of envi-
ronmental information laws is illustrated by the following general 
points. Availability and public access of environmental information 
are frequently ends in themselves. Separate government environ-
mental policy analysis and enforcement actions compete with pri-
vate citizen suits and toxic tort actions for access to· the same envi-
ronmental information. Moreover, it may be problematic to track 
how the public uses environmental information. 
7. The Pathological Paradox of "lrrJ.proved" Information 
In· any informational system, "[t]here is a danger that im-
proved infoFmation technology may lead to 'hard' quantitative 
data driving out 'soft,' but arguably mo·re important, qualitative 
data. It is much more difficult to impose the preparation and use 
of qualitative assessments than to improve hard information col-
lection and flow.""" According to -Professor Roszak,45 our capacity 
to think creatively about social problems is being undermined by 
the very information that is supposed to help us understand it. 
' Data processing replaces thought; data glut obscures basic ques-
tions of justice and purpose. Roszak states: 
' 
Information has taken on the quality of that impalpable, in-
visible, but plaudit-winning silk from which· the emperor's 
ethereal gown was supposedly spu·n. The word has received 
ambitious, global definitions that make it all good things to 
all people. Words that come to mean everything may finally 
mean nothing; yet their very emptiness may allow them to be 
filled with a mesmerizing glamour:'$ 
43. Id. 
• 
44. /d. at 86. 
45. T. RoszAK, THE CuLT OF INFORMATION (1986). 
46. Id. 
The loose but exuberant talk we hear on all sides these days about "the in-
formation economy," "the information society," is coming to have exactly 
that function. These often-repeated catch phrases and cliches are the mumbo 
jumbo of a widespread public cult. Like all cults, this one also has the inten-
tion of enlisting mindless allegiance and acquiescence. People ... have no 
clear idea what they mean by information or why they should want so much 
of it .... 
/d. at x. 
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There is a danger in the area of public environmental informa-
tion laws that more intricate and detailed raw data about pollu-
tants, emissions; ambient concentrations, and media transfers will 
be generated for public consumption without a concomitant level 
of sophistication in understanding the meaning of the data and its 
overall implications for public health, economic progress, and envi-
ronmental sustenance. · 
8. Informational. Placebos 
A final policy pathology that may ·result from public environ-
mental information laws is the danger that production and wide-
spread access to environmental information may act as a substitute 
for substantive environmental policy. "Placebo policie·s are 
designed to produce the impression of action with little or no sub-
stance in order to placate those demanding .action. ""7 Indeed, 
''[p]lacebo actions do not merely have a nil effect. The removal of 
an issue from the political agenda by the announcement of a pla-
cebo policy makes it difficult to get attention paid to arguments for 
more substantive policies."48 . 
For example, the Environmental Protection -Agency may pub-
lish warnings about natural radon contamination in home base-
ments,49 or advise people to let their drinking .water run for a few 
extra minutes to minimize lead contamination. 50 In the long run, 
• 
however, this type of agency action risks displacing more impor-
tant collective social action to resolve problems of environmental 
. 
pollution and degradation. 
' . . . 
47. B. HoGwoon & B. PETERS, supra note 23, at 172. 
48. Id. at 173. 
Further, the "lulling effect" produced by the belief that a problem is being 
dealt with might enable the problem to deteriorate drastically in the 
meantime. In the long ru~, symbolic gestures may be worse than nothing. 
They may cause disappointment and alienation, and this may cause more 
damage than ignoring the problem entirely. 
ld. (citations omitted). 
. . 
49. See 3 Tox.. L. Rep. (BNA) 534 (Sept. 21; 1988) (EPA recommends radon testing for 
all homes). 
50. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, LEAD AND YouR DRINKING WATER 
(1988). See also 2 Tox. L. Rep. (BNA) 1415 (May 18, 1988) (EPA warns that lead in drink-
ing water can cause health hazards) . 
• 
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II. THE LoGic OF SARA's HAzARDous SuBSTANCES PuBLIC 
INFORMATION PROGRAMS 
A. SARA's Public Information Programs 
571 
Congress promulgated three regulatory programs in the 1986 
SARA legislation that take a proactive approach to environmental 
quality by establishing public environmental information programs 
that address the presence and dangers of hazardous waste in com-
munities. These programs are: (I) Title III of SARA the federal 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act;rn (2) 
Section 110 of SARA, which deals with the preparation of toxico-
logical profiles of designated hazardous substances by the Agency 
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR);~2 and (3) 
Section 117(e) of SARA, which creates a public grant program to 
finance technical assistance for groups of individuals affected by 
releases from certain hazardous waste sites.63 
1. SARA Title III: The Emergency Planning and Communit)' 
Right-to-Know Act 
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
was passed by Congress as Title III to SARA.64 The two general 
objectives of Title III are to encourage and support emergency 
planning efforts by local governments with regard to chemical 
hazards, and to provide citizens and local governments with infor-
mation concerning potential community-based chemical hazards.~5 
• 
Congress included three provisions within Title III to effectuate 
these objectives. The first concerns government emergency re-
sponse planning. The second provision addresses emergency re-
lease notification by private industry. The third requires the com-
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (Supp. V 1987). 
52. See infra notes 79·84 and accompanying text. 
53. See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text. 
54. Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-
499, §§ 301-330, 100 Stat. 1613, 1729 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (Supp. V 
1987)). See also supra note 4. 
55. See Committee of Conference, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
of 1986, H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 281 (1986) [hereinafter Conference 
Committee Report]. See also, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,570 (Nov. 17, 1986). See generally, J. 
O'REILLY, EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO CHEMICAL AcciDENTS (1987); Oleinick, Fodor & Sus-
selman, Risk Management for Hazardous Chemicals: OSHA's Hazardous Communication 
Standard and EPA's Emergency Planning and Community Right·to·Know Regulations, 9 
J. LEGAL MEn. 179 (1988); Comment, Developments in Chemical Emergency Planning Leg-
islation: Toward a Comprehensive Response Program in Ohio, 17 CAP. U.L. REv. 143 (1983). 
• 
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pilation and reporting of information concerning chemical 
properties~ manufacturing, usage, properties, and release . 
. 
The first provision of Title III requires the governors of the 
various states to have established a state emergency response com-
mission by April 17, 1987.56 State commissions are also required to 
have established emergency planning districts no later than July 
17, 1987,57 and to have appointed local emergency planning com-
mittees for each district by August 17, 1987.58 
Each local committee is required to have completed prepara-
tion of an emergency response plan, no later than October 17, 
1988, containing the following information: · 
1) facilities within the district at which any one of numerous 
statutorily designated "extremely hazardous s.ubstances" at 
"threshold planning quantities" are present;~9 
2) methods and procedures for reporting a release of an ex-
tremely hazardous substance; 
3) names of community and facility coordinators; 
4) public notification procedures; 
5) methods for determining the occurrence of a release and 
the geographic area or population likely to be impacted; 
6) the available emergency equipment and facilities within 
the community; 
7) training programs; and 
8) evacuation plans. 60 
. 
"Congress intended the local planning process to be a truly com-
munity-based activity, and not simply an exercise carried out by a 
few representatives of industry and the gove:rnment bureaucracy in 
a back room at city hall."61 
The second component of Title III the emergency release no-
tification provisions requires the owner or operator of a "facil-
56. SARA § 30l(a), 42 U.S.,C. § 11001(a) (Supp. V 1987). 
57. ld. § 301(b), 42 U.S.C. § 11001(b). 
58. Id. § 301(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11001(c) (committees to be appointed by August 17, 1987t 
or thirty days after the designation of emergency planning districts, whichever was earlier). 
59. SARA §§ 302(a)(2) &. 303(c), 42 U .S.C. § § 11002(a)(2), 11003(c) (Supp. V 1987). 
The list of extremely hazardous substances originally containing 402 substances···-·is set 
forth at 40 C.F.R. Part 355, Appendix A. Forty substances were later deleted from the initial 
list. See 52 Fed. Reg. 48,072, 48,075 (Dec. 17J 1987); 53 Fed. Reg. 5574 (Feb. 25, 1988). 
60. SARA § 303(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11003(c) (Supp. V 1987). 
61. G. LowRY & R. LowRY, LowRY's HANDBOOK OF RIGHT·TO-KNow AND EMERGENCY 
PLANNING 124 (1988). 
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ity"62 to provide notification of a hazardous substance release63 
within any affected area to the community emergency coordinator 
of the local committee and to the affected state's commission.64 
The statute mandates that the notification contain specific infor-
mation. This information must include data about the chemical re-
leased,65 the estimated quantity of the hazardous substance,66 "the 
time and duration of the release,"6~ "[a]ny known or anticipated 
acute or chronic health risks associated with the emergency and, 
wher-e appropriate, advice regarding medical attention necessary 
for exposed individuals,''68 precautions to be taken in response to 
the release,69 and pertinent details regarding the contact person 
who can provide further information. 70 
The final provision is perhaps the most important public ,envi-
ronmental information mandate under Title III. This provision 
contains reporting requirements for chemical usage, chemical 
properties, manufacturing, and environmental releases. "In order 
to inform citizens about chemicals located in their communities, 
Title III requires the owners and operators of certain facilities to 
submit three types of information concerning such chemicals to 
state and local authorities."71 This information entails: (a) material 
safety data sheets (MSDS) and hazardous chemicallists;72 (b) haz-
62. A "facility" is defined, for purposes of emergency release notification, as including 
motor vehicles, r.olling stock, or aircraft. See 40 C.F.R. § 355.20 (1988) . 
. 
63. The hazardous substance must be of a "reportable quantity" of either an extremely 
hazardous substance or a hazardous substance as defined by CERCLA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 
9602(a), unless the release results in exposure to persons solely within the boundaries of a 
site on which a facility is located or is a federally permitted release as defined under CER· 
• CLA. SARA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(a) (Supp. V 1987); 40 C.F.R. § 355.40(a)(2) (1988). 
64. SARA § 304(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b)(l) (Supp. V 1987); 40 C.F.R. § 355.40(b)(1) 
(1988). 
65. SARA § 304(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b)(2)(A); 40 C.F.R. § 355.40(b)(2)(1). 
66. SARA § 304(b)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b)(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. § 355.40(b)(2)(iii). 
67. SARA § 304(b)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b)(2)(D); 40 C.F;R. § 355.40(b)(2)(iv). 
68. SARA § 304(b)(2)(F), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b)(2)(F); 40 C.F.R. § 355.40(b)(2)(vi). 
69. SARA § 304(b)(2)(G), 42 U.S.C § 11004(b)(2)(G); 40 C.F.R. § 355.40(b)(2)(vii). 
70. SARA § 304(b)(2)(H), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b)(2)(H); 40 C.F.R. § 355.40(b)(2)(viii). 
See also, G. LowRY & R. LowRY, supra note 61, at 129-30. 
' 
71. 2 THE LAw oF HAZARDous WASTE§ 10.01[4J[a] at 10-8 (8. Cooke, ed. 1988) (hereitt-
after 2 HAZARDOUS WASTE). 
72. With certain technical exceptions, any facility required to prepare MSDS's under 
the Occupational Safety and He~lth Administration's (OSHA) Hazardous Communication 
Standard is governed by Title Iii reporting requirements if a threshold quantity, as defined 
by EPA, of a substance defined as a hazardous chemical is present at the facility. SARA §,§ 
311(a)(l), (b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021(a)(l), (b) (Supp. V 1987); 40 C.F.R. §§ 370~20, 370.21(a), 
(b) (1988). SARA § 311(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 11021(a)(l) (Supp. V 1987); 40 C.F.R. §§ 
370.21(a), (b) (1988). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g) (1987) (material safety data sheet 
• 
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ardous chemical inventory information;73 and (c) toxic chemical us-
age, manufacture, and release information.'" 
All three components of Title III government emergency re-
sponse planning, emergency release notification procedures, and 
chemical inventory and usage reporting are accessible to the pub-
lic. Three specific public environmental information policies pro-
mote this accessibility: first, public participation requirements for 
local emerge11cy response committees' formulation of emergency 
response plans;7 & second, liberal public availability of local facility 
·records (emergency response plans, follow-up emergency release 
notification, MSDS's, inventory forms, lists of hazardous chemi-
cals, toxic chemical release forms);76 and, third, the EPA's develop-
ment of a national computerized toxic chemical inventory 
database.77 Moreover, citizen suit provisions create "the possibility 
of community self .. help enforcement of SARA Title III by allowing 
suits against the facility owners or ope~ators, state and local gov-
ernments, or the EPA. "78 
requirements). 
73. The owner or operator of any facility subject to the chemicallisting/MSDS submis-
sion requirements of Title III is also required to comply with annual inventory mandates. 
SARA §§ 311(d)(2). 312(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021(d)(2), 11022(a)(l) (Supp. V 1987). These 
requirements provide that by March 1 of each year, the facility owner or operator must 
prepare and submit a "tier I" or "tier II" inventory reporting form that provides informa-
tion on any hazardous chemical present at the facility in a threshold quantity during the 
previous year. 40 C.F.R. §§ 370.20(b)(2), 370.21(c)(l), 370.25 (1988). 
74. For manufacturing facilities with U.S. Department of Commerce Standard Indus-
trial Classification (SIC) numbers 20 through 39, Title III requires that the facility submit a 
yearly toxic chemical release report. SARA § 313(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11023(a) (Supp. V 1987). 
This requirement is limited to (a) facilities which have ten or more. full-time employees and 
(b) which used, manufactured, or released a threshold quantity of any of 329 toxic chemicals 
which have been listed as causing, or anticipated to cause, significant adverse human health 
effects, various chronic human health effects, or adverse effects on the environment. 40 
C.F.R. § 372.22 (1988). The initial list of chemicals contained 209 specific chemicals and .20 
chemical compound categories. SARA § 313(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11023(c) (Supp. V 1987); 40 
C.F.R. § 372.65 (1988). The EPA is given administrative discretion to add or delete from 
this list, and any person may petition the EPA to take such action. SARA §§ 313(d), (e), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 11023(d), (e) (Supp. V 1987). 
75. See supra notes 59-60 . and accompanying text. 
76. See SARA § 324(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11044(a) (Supp. V 1987). See also SARA §§ 303, 
304, 31l(c)(2), 312(e)(3), 313(c), 313(h), 324(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11003, 11004, 11021(c)(2), 
11022(e)(3), 11023(c), 11023(h), 11044(a) (Supp. V 1987). 
77. SARA § 313(j), 42 U.S.C. § 11023(j) (Supp. V 1~87). See also 53 Fed. Reg. 6567 
(Mar. 9, 1988) (notice of public meeting to discuss options for making information 
available). 
78. G. LOWRY & R. Lowav, supra note 61, at .161. Title III follows the "citizen as prose-
cutor" model by permitting citizen suits for civil penalties as well as injunctive relief. SARA 
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2. Section 110: ATSDR Toxicological Profiles and National 
Priorities List (NPL) Health Assessments 
In section 110 of SARA Congress added substantially to the 
responsibilities of the ATSDR.79 The ATSDR is now required 
within five years after the enactment of SARA to identify, develop, 
and update toxicological profiles regarding each of the 275 hazard-
ous substances most commonly found at Superfund sites.8° Consis-
tent with its past actions in setting firm and ambitious deadlines 
for the EPA, Congress directed the ATSDR to prepare 100 
profiles81 within the first six months after SARA's enactment.8~ In 
addition, section 110 requires the ATSDR to perform health as-
sessments for each facility on the NPL.83 "When such health as-
sessments indicate that exposure at a site presents a significant 
risk to human health, the EPA is directed to take actions such as 
providing alternative water supplies and permanently relocating 
residents to reduce such exposure and risk. "84 
3. Section 117(e): Public Technical Assistance Grants 
Section 117 of SARA assures public input on the selection of 
all proposals for cleanup remedies of abandoned hazardous waste 
Importantly, the citizen suit provision provides in pertinent part for "other rights" of 
citizens: 
Nothing in this section shall restrict or expand any right which any person 
(or class of persons) may have under any Federal or State statute or common 
law to seek enforcement of any requirement or to seek any other relief .... 
SARA § 326(g), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(g) (Supp. V 1987). 
79. SARA § 110, 42 U .S.C. § 9604(i) (Supp. V 1987). 
80. ld. 
81. The toxicological profiles under SARA § 110, "are to include an analysis of all avail-
able toxicological and epidemiological evaluations for a hazardous substance to ascertain 
levels of human exposure that may trigger adverse health effects and, where appropriate, an 
identification of toxicological testing needed to identify levels of exposure that may cause 
health concerns." Hayes & MacKerron, Superfund 11: A New Mandate - A BNA Special 
Report, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 83 (Feb. 13, 1987) (citations omitted). 
82. SARA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1987). 
83. Hayes & MacKerron, supra note 81, at 83. 
84. 2 HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 71, § 12.05[2](h) at 12-101. 
ATSDR may also perform health assessments in response to petitions where 
individuals or physicia.ns provide data on exposure to hazardous substances. 
If ATSDR does not initiate a health assessment in response to a petition, it 
must provide a written explanation. 
Atkeson, Goldberg, Elrod & Connors, An ·Annotated Legislative History of the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (EnvtL L. Inst.) 
10,360, 10,393 (1986). 
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sites on the Superfund NPL.8~ The Administrator or State must 
provide a notice and analysis of the proposed cleanup plan suffi-
cient to "provide a reasonable explanation of the proposed plan"86 
and a ''reasonable opp·ortunity for submission of written and oral 
comments, and an opportunity for a public meeting at or near the 
[site]"87 must also be provided. Likewise, notice of the EPA's final 
cleanup plan must be published along with a discussion of any sig-
nificant changes and the reasons for such changes. The EPA must 
also reply to significant comments, criticisms, and new data sub-
mitted by the public.8·8 
. 
Section 117(e) creates a public grant program to support tech-
nical assistance and the gathering of information for citizen groups 
in the vicinity of sites on the NPL. Under the statute, grants of up 
to $50,000 per site "may be used for technical assistance in inter-
preting information with regard to the nature of the hazard, reme-
dial investigation and feasibility study, record of decision, remedial 
design, selection and construction of remedial action, operation 
and maintenance, or removal action. "89 Congress intended that 
"[s]uch grants are not ... to be used to underwrite legal actions. 
However, any information developed through grant assistance may 
be used in any legal action affecting the [site J, including any legal 
action in a court of law."90 Moreover, while the grant recipient 
must contribute at least twenty percent of the cost of the technical 
assistance grant, both the $50,000 ceiling and the contribution re-
quirement may be waived by the EPA. No more than one grant 
under section 117(e) may be .made for a single site, but Congress 
has authorized grant renewal to facilitate public participation at all 
stages of remedial action.~1 
Testimony and deliberation before the House of Representa-
tives reveals that Congress responded to citizen demands for 
greater public involvement in the Superfund clean-up process by 
enacting the new public participation and grant provision of 
SARA. Although theoretically the EPA has provided for public 
participation,92 the congressional testimony indicated that actual 
85. SARA § 117, 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (Supp. V 1987). 
86. Conference Committee Report, supra note 55, at 230. 
87. Jd. 
88. Atkeson, Goldberg, Elrod & Connors, supra note 84, at 10,390-91. 




92. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.67 (1988) (NCP provisions on community relations). 
• 
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involvement in site investigation, remedy selection, litigatio·n, and 
settlement was primarily limited to the federal government and 
private potentially responsible parties.93 In response, Congress con-
cluded that increased public participation was both nec.essary and 
desirable. 94 
B. The Policy Logic of SARA's Public Information Programs 
1. Title III 
SARA's public information programs, particularly the Title III 
component, will promote six different policy goals. First, Title III 
will produce a baseline of 
data [that] can be used to characterize exposure levels, evalu-
ate existing regulatory strategies and develop new ones, focus 
on specific locations of concern., identify important chemical 
releases and the types of operations they come from, compare 
permitted releases to reported releases, and aid in the devel-
opment of waste minimization strategies.96 
Second, Title III holds promise for acting as "a valuable mech-
anism for effective emergency management, protecting environ-
mental concerns, offering local citizens the opportunity to have a 
significant impact on the safety of their community, and for pro-
viding a structured forum in which industry, government, and citi-
zens can work collectively on these issues. "96 
Third, Title III should be applauded as ''Congress' most sig-
nificant experiment to involve the private sector and decentralize 
environmental problem solving .... [C]itizens [must] be informed 
about hazardous materials being stored, handled, or manufactured 
in their community, and local communities [must] have a coordi-
nated emergency response plan to respond to chemical 
• 
emergencies. "97 
Fourth, while the information gathered .in the Title III process 
should be viewed as preliminary, and subject to refinement, this 
. 
93. See H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess~, pt. 1, 122-23, 131 (1985), reprinted in 
1986 U.S. ConE CoNe. & ADMIN. NEws 2904·05, 2913. 
94. /d., at 90-91, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2872-73; id. pt. 
5, at 65-66, reprinted in 1986 U.S. ConE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 3188·89. 
95. Berkowitz, The Law and The Promise, 5 ENVTL. F. 24, 28 (Oct. 1988). 
96. Makis, Now It's Everybody's Job, 5 ENVTL. -F. 25, 30 (Oct. 1988). 
97. Matsumoto, Confrontation or Compromise?, 5 ENVTL. F. 25, 25 (Oct. 1988). 
-. 
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public environmental information law will "provide Americans 
with at least two powerful pictures of the industries that put them 
at risk. Total annual discharges from the [Toxic Release Inven-
tory] data will be one picture. Another is the 'plume maps' or 'foot-
prints' of potential chemical gas releases as they travel downwind 
or downstream."98 In a related way, the Toxic Release Inventory 
data generated by the imprimatur of section 31399 will promote the 
better understanding of two major risk management problems: (a) . 
identifying and specifying the "[m]any U.S. chemical plants [that] 
do not [currently] use the Best Achievable Control Technology 
(BACT) to minimize chemical discharges'';100 and (b) developing 
. . 
some rudimentary information "regarding chemical discharges 
once they have left the plant."101 
Fifth, the emergence of information regarding toxic chemical 
releases and mass balance inventories will, no doubt, serve as 
"strong public educational and motivational tools toward the im-
provement of chemical safety.''102 Finally, Title III will facilitate 
the development of comparative emissions statistics of hazardous 
substances that will spur some industrial firms to take a leadership 
role by ''openly communicating about risks"103 with the public in 
meetings that may reflect a. "new era, and a new partnership."104 
This industrial leadership has the potential of providing exemplary 
corporate models that. will inspire other companies to respond to 
the competitive need to match the leaders' efforts.106 
. 
Title III of SARA holds considerable promise for being an ef~ 
. 
· 98. Millart The Beginnings of Chemical Control, 5 ENVTL. F. 26, 32 (Oct. 1988). 
99. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. 
100. Millar, supra note 98,_at 32. "For example, a recent [Chemical Manufacturer's As-
sociation (CMA)] study found that some small chemical plants in Louisiana are discharging 




People want to know if their family's health will be affected, if pollutants will 
come down on their children's schoolyard or on their vegetable garden. Com-
bined with their lack of knowledge regarding health effects, the industry 
looks less than socially responsible when, as reported [in the Baton Rouge 
pressl ... a CMA consultant says that 'we're not really sure where ... (the 
emissions] go, what they mix with, what they turn into, [and) where they 
come down.' 
102. /d. 
103. Young, Nothing To Lose But. Fear Itself, 5 ENVTL. F. 27, 27 (Oct. 1988). 
104. /d. at 33. 
105. Millar, supra note 98, at 26. 
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fective public environmental information law when it is reformu-
lated into the four policy roles discussed in part II of this article. 
The most impressive aspect of the statutory scheme is its process-
enhancing nature. The process value of participatory governance 
is advanced by Title III because citizens are provided a significant 
stake in learning about specific details concerning the environmen-
tal quality of their communities. Process legitimacy is also fur-
thered along with consensualism, and humaneness and respect for 
individual dignity. These values are enhanced because community 
residents are the.o~etically given equal access to environmental in-
formation and are tacitly invited to participate in negotiating im-
provements with area businesses regarding specific measures of en~ 
vironmental improvement. 
Title III's impact on other process values, however, is more 
problematic. While civic friendship is specifically acknowledged by 
bringing citizens into the information loop in conjunction with in-
dustrial and governmental representatives, it is debatable whether 
public openness and truth-telling process values will be enhanced. 
Fulfillment of both of these latter values depend upon knowledgea-
ble and informed public involvement. In its current form, Title III 
make·s no provision for systematic education and training of citizen 
groups to understand the welter of chemical data and mass balance 
information that businesses will be reporting to local emergency 
response committees. Thus, it will be difficult, if not impossible, 
for untrained citizen activists to discern exaggeration in reporting 
improvement in environmental quality and the decreased use and 
dissemination of chemical substances. The attainment of truth-
telling will be haphazard at best without a firm statutory provision 
to penalize false and misleading data reporting. 
Disparities between the availability of raw information and 
the ability to clearly understand its significance also bear on the 
efficacy of Title III in achieving the substantive policy roles 'of risk 
minimization, economic accountability and corporate action-forc-
ing. To the extent that chemical emissions information is crudely 
or incompletely linked to actual human exposure and medical risk, 
individuals will be hampered in their abilities to take responsible 
actions to minimize these risks and stymied in holding specific 
firms accountable ·ror causing medical injury, diminished life qual-
ity, and reduced property values. 
It is questionable whether Title III will force action by laggard 
firms without more coercive laws focused on measurable environ-
• 
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mental improvements.106 The efforts of several socially responsible 
businesses enterprises to follow the lead of innovative firms in re-
ducing hazardous waste generation and emissions should not be 
considered dispositive. 
2. Sections 110 & 117(e) 
. 
Section 110107 will generate much interesting and potentially 
useful data. For example, in response. to the mandate of section 
110, ATSDR has already generated draft toxicological profiles for, 
numerous hazardous substances, including the following: benzene, 
selected PCB's, nickel, chloroform, chrysene, arsenic, aldrin/dial-
drin, dioxin~ beryllium, chromium, methylene chloride, cadmium, 
tetrachloroethylene, cyanide, vinyl chloride, trichloroethylene, and 
lead.108 Consistent guidelines for publication of toxicological 
profiles have been jointly developed by the EPA and ATSDR.109 
The introduction to each profile sets forth the general rese_arch ap-
proach, explanation of research gaps, and the anticipated audi-
. . . 
ences for the toxicological information. ATSDR notes, in this 
regard: 
Each toxicological profile begins with a public health 
statement, which de.scrib,es in nontechnical language a sub-
stance's relevant toxicological properties. Following the state-
ment is material that presents levels of significant human ex-
posure and, where known, significant health effects. The 
adequacy of information to determine a substance's health ef-
fects is described in a health effects summary. Research gaps 
in toxicologic and health effects information are described in 
the profile. . . . 
The principal audiences for the toxicological profiles are 
health professionals at the federal, state, and local levels, in-
106. According to Garrett Hardin, "social arrangements that produce responsi!lility are 
arrangem.ents that create coercion." Hardin, The Tra,gedy of the Commons, 162 Set. 1243 
(1968), reprinted in T. ScHOENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAw 19, 23 (1985). Cf. Blom-
quist, Beyond the EPA and OTA Reports: Toward a Comprehensive Theory and Approach 
to Hazardous Waste Reduction in America, 18 ENVTL. L. 817 ,, 875, 894-95 (1988). 
107. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. 
108. On April17, 1987, ATSDR and EPA published the 100 most significant hazardous 
substances commonly found at superfund sites on the NPL. See 52 FED. REG. 12,869 (Apt. 
17, 1987). See also Johnson, Health Effects of Hazardous Waste: The Expanding Funct'ion 
of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Regi"stry, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10,132, 10,138 (Apr. 1988) (listing 100 substances). 
109. 52 FED. REG. 12,869 (Apr. 17, 19,87). 
• 
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terested private sector organizations and groups, and mem-
bers of the public. We plan to revise these documents [at 
least every three years] in response to public comments .... 
that will make the toxicological profile series of the greatest 
use.tlo 
581 
Each toxicological profile published by A TSDR presents infor-
mation in a format that can be useful to laypersons and scientifi-
cally trained specialists. One of the most publicly useful portions 
of each profile is the public health statement, contained in the first 
chapter of each report. The public health statement presents com-
plicated scientific information on each hazardous substance by an-
swering seven basic questions. For example, with regard to the haz-
ardous substance benzene, the ATSDR public health statement 
answers the following questions: 
1) What is Benzene? 
2} How might I be exposed to Benzene? 
3) How does Benzene get into my body? 
4) How can Benzene affect my health after brief exposures at 
high levels, or long-term exposures at various levels? 
5) Is there a medical test to determine whether I have been 
exposed to Benzene? 
6) What levels of exposure have resulted in harmful health 
effects? 
7) What recommendation has the federal government made 
to protect human health?111 
Moreover, pursuant to section 110 of SARA, the ATSDR has 
commenced developing a comprehensive national exposure registry 
of persons exposed to hazardous substances.112 The rationale for 
developing this registry indirectly bears on public environmental 
information. The ATSDR noted the following in a recent report: 
When considering environmental health issues, of particular 
concern is the lack of information on the effects of low-level 
exposures of long duration, the exposures typically found for 
the population surrounding hazardous waste sites. Also, very 
limited data are available on the health outcomes for the 
110. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, U.S. Public Health Service, 
Toxicological Profile for Benzene iv (Dec. 1987)~ 
111. /d. at 1-3. 
112. See generally Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, U.S. Public 
Health Service, Policies and Procedures for Establishing a National Registry of Persons Ex-
posed to Hazardous Substances: National Exposure Registry 3 (1988). 
• 
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populations receiving a one-time, high-level environmental 
exposure such as that experienced at chemical spill sites. Re-
gistries can be a valuable tool in addressing the potential 
health outcomes of both types of exposures . 
. . . In addition to facilitating research, the registry activi-
ties can further serve public health by being of direct service 
or benefit to the registrants. This goal can be accomplished 
by keeping the registrants informed of relevant research, 
medical interventions, or preventative measures related to 
their exposure!13 
Because of the EPA's delay in implementing regulations for 
Technical Assistance Grants, section 117(e) of SARA, compared to 
Title III and section 110, is still in its nascent stage of implementa-
tion. 114 These grants hold great potential for permitting citizen 
groups to interpret scientific and regulatory data about Superfund 
sites. Certain features of the program, however, suggest that bu-
reaucratic provisions may hamper their widespread availability 
and a full understanding of cleanup options. 
Specifically, the EPA would require citizen groups seeking 
these grants to show that the group is "threatened" by the site 
from a health, economic, or environmental standpoint.115 Along 
with this ambiguous task, these citizen groups which will have to 
be nonprofit organizations must demonstrate to the EPA's satis-
faction that they have established reliable procedures for record 
keeping and financial accountability in grant management.116 
Technical advisors selected to help citizen groups would be re-
quired to possess certain credentials, including a demonstrated 
knowledge of hazardous waste issues and academic training in a 
relevant discipline such as biochemistry, toxicology, environmental 
sciences, or engineering.117 The EPA's proposed procedures would 
also require that these scientific experts be able to translate tech-
113. /d. (emphasis ad~ed). Cf. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry for 
Health Assessments and Health Effects Studies of Hazardous Substances Releases and Fa-
cilities, 53 FED. REG. 32,259 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 90) (proposed Aug. 24, 
1988). 
114. See 2 Tox. L. Rep. (BNA) 19 (June 3, 1987) (EPA accused of delay by Sen. 
Lautengerg in issuing community action grant guidelines). See also 3 Tox. L. Rep. (BNA) 
660 (Oct. 19, 1988) (EPA finally announces first four Superfund community action grants 
after several months of harsh criticisms). 
115. 53 FED. REG. 9736 (Mar. 24, 1988). 
116. I d. at 9737-38. 
117. Id. at 9745-46. 
• 
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n,ical information into terms understood by laypersons.1 1.8 To the 
EPA's credit, the agency "plans to provide guidance materials to 
aid citizens in understanding the grant program and procedures. 
These materials include a Citizens' Guidance Manual for the 
Technical Assistance Grant Program, three videotapes, and train~ 
ing, workshops, and fact sheets on various aspects of the 
program."119 
Sections 110 and 117(e) of SARA both have potential for being 
effective public environmental info.rmation. laws wher1 evaluated in 
terms of the four policy roles discusse·d above. Both sections mirror 
the focus of Title III on process values by ameliorating par-
ticipatory governance, process legitimacy, consensualism, and hu-
maneness and respect for individual dignity. Moreover, the pres-
ence of process intermediaries an expert public health assessment 
agency and professional consultants differentiate these public in-
formation programs from the raw information reporting mecha-
nism of Title III. Accordingly, it is likely that the ATSDR toxico-
logical profile program and the EPA Technical Assistance Grant 
Program have greater potential than Title III of SARA to enhance 
process values in truth-telling and public openness, assuming that 
political motivations to manipulate the significance of scientific 
data and to reduce available funding can be overcome. To the ex-
tent, however, that the ATSDR or technical information consul-
tants do a poor job in communicating technical information and 
options to the public, the process value of civic friendship will be 
compromised. 
Sections 110 and 117(e) h·old considerable promise for improv-
ing individual risk minimization and corporate economic account-
ability because the language and structure of the provisions estab-
lish a careful and systematic legal structure for information 
gathering. Presumably, good scientific inform-ation and· technical 
analysis will lead individuals to make rational risk assessments 
about the dangers related to hazardous waste exposure and reason-
able monetary settlements with those firms responsible for causing 
medical or property damage. Sections 110 and 117(e) may be 
counterproductive to achieving a meanin.gful action-forcing role to 
the extent that business' fears are realized regarding public abuse 
of information laws by the plaintiffs' bar pursuing unjustified liti-
118. I d; at 9736. 
119. 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (EnvtL L. Inst.) 2366 (Mar. 25, 1988). 
' 
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. I 
gation. Cons.equently, industry may opt to wage a legal war fight-
ing off tort claimants rather than engage in thoughtful hazardous 
waste reduction and risk minimization measures . 
• 
III. THE PoLICY LIMITS OF SARA's HAzARDous SuBSTANCE 
INFORMATION PROVISIONS 
Utilizing the potential policy pathologies suggested earlier in 
this analysis, what are the specific deficiencies of the tripartite haz-
ardous information provisions of SARA? What detailed problems 
can be anticipated from the policy interaction between Title Ill, 
section 110, and ·section 117(e) by employing the metaphor of 
upathology"? 
. 
First, Congress did not give much attention to coordinating 
the various public environmental information provisions of SARA 
inter se or with preexisting state law. For example, before Con-
gress enacted Title Ill, several states and local governm·ents had 
already established community right-to-know programs and emer-
gency management networks . 120 With one narrow exception, Con-
gress specifically provided that Title III should not preempt these 
state and local laws.121 The question remains as to whether multi-
ple environmental public information requirements are cost-effec-
. 
tive and useful. 
Similarly, Congress inadequately addressed two issues regard-
ing the mass of information created by Title III's chemical usage 
and mass balance requirements, section llO's toxicological profiles 
and health effects studies, and section 117(e)'s technical assistance 
grants. First, Congress failed to resolve whether this information 
could be used in toxic tort .suits. By way of specific illustration, 
several members of Congress insisted in debate that the informa-
tion generated by toxicological profiles and health assessments was 
intended only for scientific and regulatory purposes, and not tort 
litigation-.. No statutory provision of SARA, howeve.r, contains this 
purported exclusion. With respect to the second issue, Congress 
did not indicate how this information could be used in the tort 
120. See Millar, supra note 98, at 28 (discussing New Jersey's programs). 
121. SARA § 321, 42 U~S.C. § 11401 (Supp. V 1987)~ State and local laws enacted after 
August 1? 1985. requiring_ the submission of MSDS's are to require that the MSDS be identi-
cal in form and content to those required under Title III. /d. States and local governments 
are specifically authorized to require additional MSDS information through the use of addi-
tional sheets or other appropriate means. ld. 
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context. It is conceivable, therefore, that a private tort plaintiff 
could utilize the public record exception contained within Federal 
Rule of Evidence 803(8)(c) to admit as hearsay ATSDR findings on 
toxicity or health effects. A tort plaintiff could also cite Federal 
Rule of Evidence 703 for the proposition that "ATSDR's profiles 
and health assessments, although arguably inadmissible for other 
Q 
reasons, may nevertheless form the basis of [an] expert's opinion 
so long as ... experts in his particular field of competence rely on 
the profiles and health assessments in formi~g their opinions.''122 
Second, as a partial consequence of lack of policy coordina-
t~on, the public environmental information provisions of SARA os-
. . 
tensibly conflict with other policy goals. Generally, policy conflicts 
occur because of the strong emphasis on protecting public health 
provided by public environmental information programs of SARA. 
The ATS.DR's responsibilities under section 110 and the public 
participation rights under section 117(e), pose serious tensions 
with other sections of SARA that mandate expedited remedial ac-
tion at hazardous waste sites .. 
In SARA, Congress took major strides toward making 
public health the primary focus of the Superfund program .. 
Given the paramount importance of public health questions, 
this is a welcome development. For the regulated community, 
the environmental community, and government agencies 
charged with implementing the new provisions, there are 
great challenges presented by the need to reconcile the health 
goals of the Act with other goals, especially the need for rapid 
remedial action .. Such potential conflict is vexing, particularly 
when one considers that a public health threat might be 
heightened because selection of a remedial action is delayed 
in order to assemble comprehensive health effects data.123 
Moreover, the policy goals of accuracy and professional con-
sensus, generally employed by the scientific community, are likely 
to conflict with the time schedule provisions in section 110. "[T]he 
122. Sherwood & Fitzsimmons, The ATSDR: A Plaintiff's Dream Come True?, 2 Tox. 
L. Rep. (BNA) 1072, 1078 (Mar. 2, 1988). See also 2 Tox. L. Rep. (BNA) 265 (July 29, 1987) 
(section 110 "creates new field for toxic tort litigation"'); 1 Tox. L. Rep. (BNA) 1257 (Apr. 8, 
1987) (SARA said to provide plaintifrs counsel with "motherlode" of health-effects 
evidence). . 
123. Strock, Superfund Amended: A New Emphasis on the Public Health, 2 Tox. L. 
Re.p. (BNA) 648, 652 (Nov. 4. 1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9616 which imposes new schedules 
for Superfund program to the EPA) (footnote omitted). 
• 
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ra_pidity with which the ATSDR is required to generate numerous 
toxicity profiles and health studies raises a concern as to the qual-
ity and reliability of the resulting data."124 In addition, strict busi-
ness re·porting ·requirements under the emergency notification and 
Community Right-to-Know provisions of Title III .have the poten-
tial to undermine the salutary federal commercial policy of pro-
tecting legitimate trade secrets and proprietary information. 126 
In attempting to comply with the emergency notification 
requirements, businesses will face several competing .consider-
ations. On the one hand,. the notice provided might trigger 
toxic tort suits based on theories ranging from physical in-
jury to enhanced risk or injury to emotional distress. On the 
other hand, if companies do not report the full scope of the 
risk presented on the basis of the best information available, 
they could face immense civil and criminal penalties.126 
Indeed, an implicit conflict ~ay exist between congressional policy 
to encourage voluntary and effective waste reduction and waste 
minimization rneasures.127 
A third potential policy pathology of the threefold public envi-
ronmental information structure of SARA is the anticipated 
hyperactivity resulting from the information that the reporting re-
quirements will spur. One commentator has suggested the likeli-
hood of an unintended and . counterproductive linkage between 
"Title III data [and] ATSDR's toxicological profiles to create an 
instant docket of toxic tort suits. ''128 Thus, according to this 
viewpoint, 
[T]he information regarding toxic chemical releases required 
to be disclosed by Title III could be similar in effect to the 
effluent discharge self-reporting required under ' the_ Federal 
Clean Water Act, i.e., admissions at the hands of plaintiff at-
torneys. Thus, there is considerable uncertainty as to how the 
information generated by the SARA 'programs will be used.129 
124. 2 HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 71, § 12.05[3](h), at 115-16. 
125. /d. 
12ft Strock, supra note_ 123, at 650 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11045 (Supp. V 1987)) (footnote 
omitted). See 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (BNA) 496 (June 30, 1989) (EPA fines 42 companies $1.65 
million, citing failure to report toxic discharges). 
127. See generally Blomquistt supra note 106. 
128. Ruhl, Increased Public Information: How Will It Be Used or Abused?, 3 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T. 32, 33 (Fall 1988). 
129. Jd. 
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Another knowledgeable observer, focusing on the impact of 
publicly available ATSDR data on the proliferation of toxic tort 
• 
suits, contends that: 
• 
The mandate of the ATSDR both :to study the most common 
Superfund site contaminants and to perform health assess-
. 
ments at all NPL sites will generate a great deal of publicly 
available chemical toxicity and health risk data. This infor-
mation is likely to generate significant public concern and 
controversy in communities near Superfund sites. It will also 
provide a readily accessible and potentially powerful source of 
. 
evidence for toxic tort plaintiffs seeking to prove that their 
health problems and risks were caused by contamination from 
hazardous waste sites. 130 
• 
In response to Title III disclosures, an industrial engineer ex-
pressed the following concern about government hyperactivity: 
• 
Given the lack of resources [from inadequate congres-
sional funding, Title Ill] has the potential to cause the worst 
kind of bureaucratic disaster. First, the entire question of how 
to control hazardous chemicals is a volatile one. The public 
both fears and distrusts industry despite its own ignorance 
and unpreparedness to deal with the management of these 
chemicals. 
Industry vehemently opposes outside involvement in 
what it views as its own management decisions. Some fear 
that [Title III's] directives will lead to further government 
controls as the public responds with fear to risks from the 
disclosed data. Others are afraid that [Title III] will create a 
database that the government will use against them for en-
forcement purposes. At the very least, they fear that the data 
will generate unnecessary public concern.131 
• 
Fourth, there are numerous potential information-specific pol-
icy pathologies132 inherent in the public environmental information 
programs of SARA. The prospect of "information overload~' vast 
quantities of raw data about chemical use, emissions, and health 
effects leading to faulty informational receptors seems to be a 
problem caused by the haphazard way that Congress designed the 
130. 2 HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 71, § 12.05[3)[h], at ~2-115 (footnote omitted); 
see id. n.57. 
131. Matsumoto, supra note 97, at 31. 
132. See also notes 32-50 and accompanying text. 
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programs. While sections 110 and 117 (e) provide the public with 
assistance in processing vast quantities of raw data, Title III pro-
vides "absolutely no guidance· or assistance ... to local authorities 
on how to digest {chemical_ inve.ntory and emissions] informa-
tion."133 Because Congress and other responsible federal, state, and 
local-governmental authorities have not adequately determined the 
policy relevance of the deluge of environmental information dis-
closed to the public, the SARA programs risk developing patholog-
ical failure in communicating information to private and public 
decisionmakers, government learning disabilities, and pathologies 
arising from attempts .to improve existing information. Conse-
quently, the quantity of environmental information does not neces-
sarily lead to qualitative .policy outcomes. In order for qualitative 
government policy judgments and public understanding to ensue, 
companies which use or store hazardous chemicals in the commu-
nity, or have been identified. a·s Potentially Responsible Parties at 
Superfund sites, will need to explain the risk significance of the 
raw data to government officials and private citizens. In order to 
do this, it is fundamental that toxicity information be matched 
with exposure information.134 Likewise, it is essential that limita-
tions in available information be explained since "[e]xperience sug-
gests that health risk assessment is at best an inexact and uncer-
tain science, dependent on numerous unverified assumptions, and 
that the results of such studies are susceptible to being misinter-
preted and misused. " 136 
Government and business will both risk the pathological pol· 
icy outcomes of achieving informational placebos, at best, or litig-
ious and regulatory hyperactivity, at worst, unless they pursue ex-
traordinary outreach efforts in starting the long and arduous 
process of e-ducating the public about the meaning of specific toxic-
ity, health assessment, and chemical usage data generated through 
the public hazardous waste information programs. Indeed, 
[t]o bring this message home to the [public] requires an in-
depth, knowledgeable, fairly personalized presentation of the 
facts. A proper balance must be struck. On the one hand, the 
133. Ruhl, supra note 128, at 33. 
134. See Young, supra note 103, at 27 (exploring Monsanto's efforts at accompanying 
chemical mass balance information with air·modeling); Millar supra note 98, at 32 ("Worth-
while toxic risk assessment requires a detailed emissions monitoring system of toxic air or 
water discharges; a system that could be lacking in as many as 99 percent of American 
communities."). . 
135. 2 HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 71, § 12.05[3] (h), at 12·115; see id. n.58. 
1990] 
• 
Public Information Mandates 
instruction must impress the audience enough to galvanize 
proper preventive behavior; on the other hand, a message that 
is either too forceful or hyperbolic will either turn off listeners 
or quite pos~ibly make many of them neurotic. The objective 
is to make [the public] respond positively to the risk by instil-
ling a reasonable degree of anxiety or apprehension without 
engaging in the sort of unfounded exaggeration that engen-
ders irrational responses. 136 
CoNCLUSION 
589 
The logic and limits of public information mandates under 
SARA the chemical usage and mass balance data requirements, 
toxicological and health assessment information, and technical as-
sistance grants for citizens living in the vicinity of Superfund sites 
-point to the need for government, business, and citizens to build 
a relationship of trust. As persuasively articulated in the book Get-
ting Together: Building A Relationship That Gets to Yes, 137 this 
will require more than a mere exchange of information and parti-
san perce-ptions about the environmental information .. 136 It will re-
quire unconditio.nally constructive interaction which balances emo-
tion with reason, seeks true understanding, listens to opposing 
views, exhibits reliability, tries persuasion, and accepts others as 
worth dealing with and learning from. 139 
Without a relational approach betwe.en government, business, 
and the public, the policy roles of public environmental informa-
tion laws are less likely to be achieved and their policy pathologies 
more likely to result. 
136. Harris, Communicating the Hazards of Toxic Substance Exposure, 39 J. OF LEG. 
Eouc. 97, 109 (1989) (footnote omitted). Cf. G. LOWRY & R. LOWRY, supra note 61: 
Sometimes people are unwilling to accept a situation because they think it is 
much riskier than it actually is. Other times, some individuals may be willing 
to accept a situation because they think it is much less risky than it actually 
is. A large part of the reason for the Right-to-Know movement is to provide 
' (people] with reliable information about material hazards so they can better 
understand the risks and consequently make better decisions. 
/d. at 13. 
• 
137. See generally R. FISHER & S. BROWN, GETTING ToGETHER: BuiLDING A RELATION-
SHIP THAT GETS TO YES (1988). 
138. I d. at 25. 
139. Id. at 40. 
